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Because a firm’s optimal knowledge search behavior is determined by unique firm and industry
conditions, organizational performance should be contingent on the degree to which a firm’s
actual level of knowledge search deviates from the optimal level. It is thus hypothesized that
deviation from the optimal search, in the form of either overexploitation or overexploration, is
detrimental to organizational performance. Furthermore, the negative effect of search deviation
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expected to become more harmful, whereas overexploration becomes less so with an increase in
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Knowledge search is a fundamental mechanism by which firms learn and organizational
knowledge evolves (Huber, 1991; March, 1991). Search is often broadly classified into two
types: exploitative (local) search and explorative (distant) search (Levinthal & March, 1981;
March, 1991; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). Firms that focus more on exploitative search follow
a path of knowledge deployment and generation that is closely related to their existing
knowledge bases and current organizational routines (Helfat, 1994; March, 1991). On the
other hand, explorative search behaviors involve a conscious effort to move away from
the existing knowledge base and routines (Greve, 2007; March, 1991; Miner, Bassoff, &
Moorman, 2001).
To the extent that exploitation and exploration compete for limited organizational resources,
there is a tradeoff between these two, and organizations make explicit and implicit choices
between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991). Different implications can be drawn from
previous perspectives regarding whether a firm should place greater emphasis on exploitation
or on exploration. According to the resource- and knowledge-based views of the firm (Barney,
1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984), a source of firms’ competitive advantage is
firm-specific resources that result from internal accumulation of strategic knowledge and asset
stocks (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), which is a key feature of exploitative search. This perspective
suggests that exploitative search is generally more desirable than explorative search. On the
other hand, some scholars argue that sustainable competitive advantage relies more heavily on
a firm’s ability to move beyond exploitation and on how it reconfigures its knowledge base
through exploration (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). In terms of
this view, moving toward more exploration should be a more desirable search behavior.
In an attempt to examine which emphasis is more desirable for firms, however, few stud-
ies have explicitly considered the role of each firm’s unique internal and external conditions.
In fact, it might be reasonable to believe that because of the heterogeneity across firms in
terms of their internal knowledge resources and asset conditions as well as differences in
their operational environments, the appropriate search strategy for different firms may vary
greatly. If this were the case, it would not be meaningful to draw any conclusion about which
type of search is more desirable for a firm if there is failure to consider the determinants of
search behavior. The first aim of this study, therefore, is to establish a baseline argument that
firms’ choice of search behavior is endogenous to unique firm and industry conditions and
thus what is considered optimal or appropriate search behavior also varies across firms.
The argument above suggests that there should be a fit between a firm’s unique firm and
industry conditions and its knowledge search strategy. Nevertheless, firms are not expected to
always emphasize the type of search that has the best fit with their unique conditions. For
example, a firm’s managers may not choose a knowledge search strategy with the intention of
improving firm performance because, for example, there are agency conflicts between the man-
agers and the shareholders of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Even if managers attempt to
choose their search behaviors in a performance-enhancing manner, the firm’s actual search
behavior may still deviate from what is desirable because of other types of managerial biases or
mistakes (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987; Weinstein, 1980). Considering these premises, we argue
that search deviation, or the extent to which a firm’s search behavior deviates from its optimal
level, has a negative impact on organizational performance. This fills a gap in the knowledge
search literature, because to our best knowledge the current study is the first to examine the per-
formance implications of actual knowledge search deviation from an optimal level.
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The idea of an optimal level of search implies that a firm’s exploitative and explorative
search behaviors may be best regarded as two ends of a continuum instead of orthogonal
choices.1 It is reasonable to assume that firms’ knowledge search capability is subject to the
scarcity of resources and thus firms must face a choice of putting greater emphasis on explo-
ration versus exploitation. This argument is consistent with March’s (1991) original idea and
some more recent work (e.g., Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993; Miller,
Zhao, & Calatone, 2006; Mitchell & Singh, 1993; Perretti & Negro, 2006; Wadhwa & Kotha,
2006) that also treated exploitation and exploration as a continuum.
We further analyze the role of environmental dynamism in either mitigating or exacer-
bating the negative effect of search deviation on organizational performance. We argue that
the detrimental effect of overexploration and overexploitation varies under different levels of
environmental dynamism. Specifically, overexploitation is expected to become more harm-
ful, whereas overexploration becomes less so with an increase in environmental dynamism.
In addition to contributing directly to research, the argument and empirical support found in
this study provide important practical implications: Managers can be guided to minimize
potential damage in the case of committing mistakes in knowledge search, when it is difficult
to engage in the exact “appropriate” level of search.
We examine these arguments in the context of patented innovations. Some previous stud-
ies examined exploitative and explorative search in the context of innovations either in terms
of patents (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Stuart & Podolny, 1996) or in terms of journal pub-
lications (Greve, 2007; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). None of these studies, however,
applied innovation data to examine directly the relationship between search deviation and
organizational performance, as we do here. In the following sections, we first develop the
baseline argument that a firm’s optimal knowledge search strategy is determined by various
firm and industry conditions and then move on to the hypotheses linking knowledge search
deviation to organizational performance.
Hypotheses Development
Endogenous Knowledge Search
Drawing on several streams of theoretical framework and recent studies on the antecedents
of search (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2007), we argue that a set of firm- and industry-level
factors could affect a firm’s search strategy. First, the organization theory (e.g., Hannan &
Freeman, 1984; Hofer & Schendel, 1978) and literature on industrial organization economics
(Bain, 1956; Caves, Porter, & Spence, 1980) suggest that external environmental forces can
affect a firm’s tendency toward either exploitation or exploration. For instance, a firm’s search
may be influenced by institutional pressures such as the search behavior of its competitors
or of those in its social network (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
Market dynamism may also stimulate innovative exploration. In a constantly changing
industry environment, firms need to update their knowledge base continuously to adapt more
effectively to the changing environment (Andrews, 1980; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Teece
et al., 1997). Furthermore, in the face of intensive industry competition, explorative search may
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become less rewarding because competition may invoke imitation by rivals that rips away
any potential rents from exploration (Bain, 1956; Caves et al., 1980; Mueller, 1986).
Second, the evolutionary theory of the firm and organizational learning perspectives suggest
that interfirm differences in knowledge search strategies exist even when the environmental
challenges facing firms are similar (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Sorenson & Sorensen,
2001). As a result of heterogeneous organizational evolution process, different firms possess
their own unique routines or capabilities (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Nelson & Winter, 1982),
which in turn lead to important differences in firms’ ability to understand signals about the
opportunities available in their environment and to form responses to them. Because firms’ rou-
tines and response strategies are developed in a path-dependent manner (Nelson & Winter,
1982), their existing knowledge structure, such as their technological scope and previous
knowledge search behavior, should influence their current search strategy.
Third, some arguments in the literature on the behavioral theory of the firm suggest that
several organizational characteristics may influence a firm’s search behavior. In a decision-
making context where complete assessment of all the possibilities and payoffs associated
with each possibility is impossible, managers may use the satisficing principle as a guide for
decision making (Simon, 1955). For example, firms with a low satisficing point may end the
search process early, resulting in a lower likelihood for exploration (Winter, 2000). On the
other hand, as a firm’s actual performance increases relative to its satisfying point or aspira-
tion level, it may be more likely to engage in explorative innovations (Cyert & March, 1963;
Greve, 2007; Levinthal & March, 1981). Firms are also found to take on more risks by
engaging in greater exploration when they face the threat of bankruptcy or experience finan-
cial distress (Ketchen & Palmer, 1999; March & Shapira, 1987). Furthermore, because
exploration involves more technological and market risks and lower fit to the existing knowl-
edge, organizational slack has a greater effect on explorative search than on exploitative
search (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2007).
Although identification of the above industry and firm attributes may not always explic-
itly rely on efficiency-based considerations and, moreover, the role of these attributes in a
firm’s search decision is not always fully agreed on, these attributes provide useful clues
about what is considered appropriate search behavior. For example, frequent changes in the
environment provide a strong signal for the need to explore new solutions and implement
organizational change (e.g., Hofer & Schendel, 1978). As a result, exploration should be
desirable search behavior. As another example, when a firm is approaching bankruptcy, it is
generally desirable to take on more risks from the perspective of shareholders, although such
risk taking is often against the welfare of other stakeholders such as the creditors (D’Aveni,
1989). In sum, we expect that firms’ optimal search behavior is influenced by their industry
operational environment and unique firm conditions.
Deviation in Search Behavior and Organizational Performance
The argument above suggests that firms should vary in terms of their optimal level of
search because of differences across firms in their knowledge asset stock and operational
environments. This implies that there should be a fit between firms’ unique features and their
appropriate search level. However, some firms may inevitably make strategic choices that
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deviate from those which are considered appropriate (Sampson, 2004). Deviations between
the actual and optimal level of knowledge search may originate from two potential sources:
managerial misbehavior attributable to the agency conflict between managers and share-
holders and managerial mistakes as a result of psychological biases.
First, according to the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), managers may make deci-
sions that depart from shareholder value maximization. Thus, managerial misbehavior may be
one of the key reasons for deviations between some firms’ actual search behavior and the opti-
mal one. Search deviation in such context, in the form of either overexploitation or overexplo-
ration, is often associated with the manager’s risk attitude and behavior. Wiseman and
Gomez-Mejia (1998) suggested that managers may exhibit risk-seeking as well as risk-averse
behaviors. For example, managers who are greatly concerned about their employment risk are
likely to be more risk averse than the firm shareholders desire (Amihud & Lev, 1981;
Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987) and thus may engage in excessive exploita-
tion. On the other hand, managers whose preference for achievement is stronger than their
desire to avoid failure may enjoy the challenge that risks entail and thus are more likely to
undertake overly risky search strategies biased toward exploration (McClelland, 1961).
Second, some psychological studies (March & Shapira, 1987; Weinstein, 1980) suggest
that individuals may engage in biased decision making. Managers tend to be more optimistic
about strategy outcomes that they can control and to which they are highly committed, sug-
gesting that managers may be overconfident of the success of their existing projects (Heaton,
2002), leading to escalation of commitment bias and excessive exploitation (Staw, 1981).
Leonard-Barton (1995) found evidence that managers may be trapped by their experiences
in exploitation and become less sensitive to the need for exploration, even if greater explo-
ration is necessary to deal with changes in the environment. On the other hand, overconfi-
dent managers may also overestimate their abilities to explore new areas and fail to fully
consider the risk of exploration. For example, Simon and Houghton (2003) examined a sample
of high-technology firms and found that overconfidence was positively related to the degree
to which product introductions were pioneering or risky when, in fact, these products were
less likely to achieve success.
The argument that a firm’s search choice may deviate from its optimal level suggests that
the performance implications of exploration versus exploitation should hinge on the degree of
deviation between a firm’s chosen search behavior and the optimal search behavior that would
maximize firm value. Search deviation, in the form of either overexploration or overexploita-
tion, involves the inefficient use of valuable corporate resources and thus imposes costs on the
firm. For example, firms that engage in excessive exploitation are found to have difficulty in
maintaining their leadership positions in the industry (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997). Similarly,
excessive exploration can also be detrimental to firm performance. For example, the unrelated
diversification strategy (akin to excessive exploratory behavior) adopted by companies in the
1960s proved to be unsuccessful (Caves et al., 1980; Montgomery, 1982). Therefore, we can
expect that the more a firm’s search deviates from what is desirable, the higher the cost of
search deviation and the worse the firm performance. To the extent that several firm- and
industry-level attributes predict optimal search choices, the benefits accruing to a firm should
be greater when the firm chooses search behavior based on these attributes than when the
search decision is not so chosen. 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms that deviate from optimal search behavior as predicted by key firm- and industry-
level attributes will perform worse than firms whose search behavior does not deviate from what
is predicted by these attributes.
Environmental Dynamism and the Performance 
Effect of Deviation in Search Behavior
Firms may overexploit or overexplore, leading to a negative effect on organizational per-
formance. However, the negative performance effect is not expected to be the same under all
conditions, given the same extent of search deviation. In practice, it is difficult to obtain the
exact “optimal” level of knowledge search. Understanding the conditions under which a cer-
tain type of search deviation (e.g., overexploration or overexploitation) may have relatively
less detrimental consequences should thus be helpful. As a result, the negative performance
effect of search deviation may be minimized. Because the exploitation of old certainties and
the exploration of new possibilities are closely related to and are influenced by a firm’s oper-
ational environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), the role of environmental dynamism in
influencing the performance effect of search deviation is considered in the study.
Environmental dynamism describes the rate and unpredictability of change in a firm’s
external environment (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984). In the absence of environmental
demand for change, organizational performance is often simply a reflection of how firms
take the best advantage of their existing knowledge assets, routines, and capabilities. Previous
studies suggest that a firm can achieve a higher likelihood of successful knowledge accu-
mulation and positive financial outcomes when it engages in exploitation by concentrating
in the areas of its established routines and capabilities (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Stuart
& Podolny, 1996). Even when the extent of exploitation goes beyond the optimal level and
thus causes the organization to suffer, the performance decline is generally not very signifi-
cant because overexploitation in a stable operating environment may reduce the deployment
efficiency of the firm’s fundamental knowledge assets, routines, and capabilities, but this is
unlikely to completely erode the firm’s value.
On the other hand, when the firm’s operating environment is highly dynamic, excessive
exploitation by sticking to existing routines or capabilities reduces the flexibility of the firm to
make effective adaptations. In a rapidly changing operating environment, previously developed
capabilities may not be able to keep up with the frequent changes in product and technologi-
cal conditions, leading to a higher probability of misfit between a firm’s existing capabilities
and the environment where the firm’s existing routines or capabilities should be deployed
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990, 2001; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Moreover, when the
decision context changes, a firm that engaged in excessive exploitation develops a stronger
inertia and becomes less likely to give up existing routines and operational approaches even
when environmental conditions have rendered a particular search direction less attractive
(Burgelman, 1994; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). Unlike in a stable environment, in a dynamic
environment the damage of overexploitation is more severe because it is likely to be associated
with the obsolescence of existing routines and capabilities. These arguments suggest that the
negative effect of overexploitation increases with environmental dynamism. 
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Hypothesis 2a: The negative effect of overexploitation on organizational performance is greater
with an increase in the level of environmental dynamism.
The problem of misfit between a firm’s existing routines and capabilities and the firm’s
operational environment under a high level of environmental dynamism may be mitigated if
the firm is capable of exploring new areas and building new capabilities. Exploration reduces
the risk of value erosion associated with firms’ existing capabilities under environmental
dynamism by broadening the number of design alternatives available to manage potential envi-
ronmental changes (Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). Greater flexibility brought
about by exploration also helps overcome organizational inertia. Firms engaging in continuous
exploration are likely to have technical groups with varied perspectives and are thus better able
to reframe problems and overcome familiar thought patterns and competence traps when the
environment demands organizational change (Amabile, 1988; Levitt & March, 1988; Kaplan
& Simon, 1990; Utterback, 1971). As a result, prior routines and experiences may be better
adapted and applied in new situations, and, more important, the likelihood of adopting new
approaches increases (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Scott & Pascoe, 1987).
Even if exploration becomes excessive and the firm becomes overly flexible such that its
financial outcome is negatively affected, it is still unlikely that the firm loses all the benefits
from its increased flexibility in making organizational changes that are necessary in dealing
with environmental dynamism. To the extent that a high level of exploration enables the firm
to adapt to the changing environment, environmental dynamism mitigates the negative effect
of overexploration on firm performance. In contrast, overexploration is expected to be more
detrimental to organizational performance in a stable environment because it not only brings
unnecessary risk but also exhausts valuable firm resources and capabilities that are necessary
for efficient exploitation.
Hypothesis 2b: The negative effect of overexploration on organizational performance is weaker
with an increase in the level of environmental dynamism.
Methods
Data and Sample
Three main data sources were enlisted in this study: Standard & Poor’s Compustat, U.S.
patent data, and the U.S. Census of Manufacturers. The original sample is drawn from U.S.
manufacturing companies listed in the Standard & Poor’s Compustat series. The focus on
manufacturing firms enabled us to construct a sample with a large group of firms that shared
some common characteristics in terms of their knowledge search processes but, at the same
time, provided variations in terms of the level of knowledge search and patenting activities
across firms. These companies were then merged with patent citation data from the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) using CUSIP numbers. Because the NBER data are
matched with Compustat data for 1989 (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001), we used the 5
years closest to 1989 (1987-1991) as the time period for this study. This minimized problems
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such as the effect of name changes and the entry and exit of sample firms, which increase as
the sample is further away from the matching year. Patent data are used to construct measures
of our key independent variables, explorative and exploitative search, as well as one of the
dependent variables, innovative performance.
Additional industry-level data were obtained from the U.S. Census of Manufacturers. After
we deleted observations with missing values in the Compustat series or the Census of
Manufacturers and also eliminated firms that had patents issued in only one of the five sample
years, the final panel included 570 firms that had patents issued in at least 2 years in the 5-year
period between 1987 and 1991. The sample of firms was distributed over 17 two-digit and
58 three-digit SIC codes. The final sample consisted of 2,006 firm-year observations. The total
number of patents included was 54,362, averaging about 27 patents per firm per year.
Model Specification
To test for the argument that knowledge search is endogenously determined by various
firm and industry factors, we applied two interrelated approaches. The first was to regress
the knowledge search on the series of firm- and industry-factors that are expected to affect
search. If significant coefficients were found for many of these predicting variables, we
expected that there was a high likelihood that search behavior was endogenous. The second
approach was to conduct a Hausman’s endogeneity test. In the Hausman’s test, in addition
to the regression of knowledge search on the series of variables, we calculated the residuals
from this equation and included them as an additional regressor in the equation with financial
performance as the dependent variable. If the coefficient on this additional regressor (the
residuals) was significantly different from zero, then we could conclude that search behavior
was endogenous.
We included two instrumental variables in the Hausman’s test: lagged firm-level search
variable and industry-level search.2 The first is a lagged endogenous variable, which is one
of the most commonly used approaches to the choice of instruments in time series or panel
data (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 2003). The second instrumental variable, industry-level search,
is the average level of knowledge search among firms in an industry where a focal firm
resides. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that organizations tend to become more similar
over time by adopting similar organizational practices through institutional isomorphism.
According to this logic, it is reasonable to expect that the search behavior of industry peers
has a positive influence on a focal firm’s search behavior. On the other hand, it is unlikely
that how other firms in the same industry search directly affects the focal firm’s subsequent
performance.
Some of our models that estimate the relationship between search deviation and organi-
zational performance involve innovation performance as the dependent variable, which is
measured as a nonnegative count variable. To estimate such models, Poisson or negative
binomial regressions are often applied (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Rosenkopf & Nerkar,
2001). Poisson models were not appropriate here because there was overdispersion in the
data. Thus negative binomial regressions were applied in estimating these models.
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Measures
Organizational performance. We adopted two measures of organizational performance in
this study: innovation performance in terms of patent citations and Tobin’s q as a market-
based financial performance measure. Following previous research that has used patents as
a measure of knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001),
we measured the innovation performance of each firm in terms of citation-based patent
count, or the total number of citations received by a firm’s patents in a given year. Self-
citations were excluded, thus limiting this measure to the number of subsequent citations by
other firms. Citations received also captured the degree to which knowledge generated by a
firm is assimilated by other firms, which has been described in the literature as the impact
of the firm’s patents on subsequent technological evolution (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) or
the usefulness of the patents (Fleming, 2001). In particular, we tracked all patents that cited
the focal patents after they were granted. For each firm in a given year, we took all its patents
in this year as the base and counted the number of citations to these focal patents by all sub-
sequent patents by other firms up to 1999, which is the last year covered by the NBER patent
citation data. Because large firms may have more patents than small firms, we used firm size,
as measured by the logged number of employees, to scale the total patent citations received
to assess a firm’s innovation performance.
Tobin’s q, a market-based performance measure, was adopted as the financial performance
measure in this study. In the context of this paper, Tobin’s q is superior to other accounting-
based measures such as return on assets (ROA) because it is forward looking and thus can
avoid the potential concern of a time lag between firm search behavior and accounting-based
performance. Tobin’s q was approximated as the firm’s market-to-book ratio, because this
measure explains more than 96% of the variance in a more sophisticated Tobin’s q
(e.g., Lindenberg & Ross 1981). The market value numerator was the year-end market value
of the firm’s common stock plus the book value of preferred stock and debt, and the book
value denominator was year-end total assets.
Explorative/exploitative search. Exploitative search refers to search efforts in the neigh-
borhood of a firm’s current expertise or knowledge base. Explorative search refers to search
efforts that attend to more distant fields beyond the firm or its existing technological fields.
To capture the tradeoff between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991), we use the
proportion of explorative search—defined as the ratio between the effort a firm puts into
explorative search and the total search effort—to measure the firm’s search behavior. More
specifically, we examine two dimensions of search: organizational and technological
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Exploitative (explorative) search can be done organizationally
within (outside) a firm’s own past innovations or technologically within (outside) its existing
technological fields (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf & Nerkar,
2001; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). In the technological dimension, we followed previous studies
(e.g., Hall et al., 2001; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001)
to use the three-digit primary patent class developed by the U.S. Patent Office to define a
firm’s technical domain.
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We constructed two continuous measures of the proportion of explorative search: explo-
rative search (beyond the firm), measured by the count of prior article citations made in
patent applications that originated outside of the focal firm’s previous patents, divided by
total patent citations made, and explorative search (out of domain), measured by the count
of prior citations made in patent applications that originated from different technological
domains. Because the search variables are bounded between zero and one, a logarithmic
transformation was applied to convert the variable into an unbounded one (e.g., Demsetz &
Lehn, 1985). These measures of search were simply lagged by 1 year to obtain the lagged
search variables.
Search deviation. The degree of search deviation captures the extent to which a firm’s
search behavior deviates from what is predicted by unique firm and industry conditions. In
developing this measure, we estimated the predicted value for explorative search by regressing
the proportion of explorative search as a function of these firm- and industry-level attributes.
The degree of search deviation was then defined as the absolute value of the firm’s actual
degree of exploration minus the predicted degree of exploration. The predicted level of
exploration is a reasonable proxy for the optimal level of search because the use of this proxy
is rather consistent with our theoretical argument. One of our key arguments is that firms
vary in their levels of optimal search because of their unique firm- and industry-level features.
The optimal search, therefore, should be determined by these unique firm and industry
features. When the actual search value is greater than the predicted value, there is an over-
exploration; and when the actual search value is smaller than the predicted value, there is an
overexploitation.
Firm-level variables predicting optimal search level. The following firm-level attributes
were expected to affect search behavior: performance relative to aspirations, slack, finan-
cial distress, and technological scope. Aspiration is often modeled as a function of own-firm
past performance (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996).
Thus, in this study, aspiration was operationalized as the focal firm’s performance 1 year
prior to its past performance (t-2). Performance relative to the aspiration level, then, was the
difference between a firm’s performance at t-1 and its performance at t-2. As in previous
studies (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), ROA was used as the performance
measure. Following the methods of Bourgeois (1981) and Singh (1986), we used each
firm’s current ratios (current assets divided by current liabilities) to represent available firm
slack. The slack variables were lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variables. Also fol-
lowing previous research (e.g., Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Miller & Reuer, 1996), we
used Altman’s Z score (Altman, 1968) as a measure of financial distress or distance from
bankruptcy. A negative sign was added in front of this variable purely for ease of interpre-
tation, so that the measure’s sign corresponded to the construct of the degree of financial
distress and bankruptcy risk. We measured a firm’s technological scope by calculating the
Blau index of the firm’s patenting across patent three-digit technology classes (e.g., Ahuja
& Katila, 2004). Last, firm size may affect firm search behavior and was thus included in
the equation as a control variable.
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Industry-level variables predicting optimal search level. We included two measures at the
industry-level in the model: industry levels of competition and environmental dynamism. We
measured industry-level competition by the four-firm concentration ratio. Both industry-
level variables were obtained from the Census of Manufacturers. As in previous studies, we
used industry-level shipment, or volatility in customer demand for certain products, to derive
a measure of environmental dynamism (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Simerly & Li, 2000). Such a mea-
sure of dynamism reflects the need for frequent development of new products and for fre-
quent technological advances that give rise to the new products. For a firm facing frequent
changes in product conditions, overexploitation of previously developed innovative knowl-
edge (compared with overexploration) would be most harmful to the firm, leading to a higher
likelihood of misfit between its existing innovations and the product market where the inno-
vations are deployed (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007). In particular,
we regressed the value of industry shipments over 5 years against time and used the standard
error of the regression coefficient related to a time dummy variable divided by the average
value of the industry’s shipment to produce a standardized index of environmental uncer-
tainty. Because patenting activities may vary significantly across industries (e.g., Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987), in addition to the above industry-level explanatory vari-
ables, we also controlled for industry and time effects by adding industry (at the two-digit
SIC level) and year dummy variables.
Instrumental variables. We included two instrumental variables in our analysis: lagged
search and industry-level search. Lagged search is simply measured by the level of explo-
rative search that is lagged by 1 year. Industry-level search is calculated as the average level
of explorative/exploitative search of firms in the same industry (with the focal firm excluded).
Note that the firms included to calculate the industry average were taken from the originally
matched Patent-Compustat data in order to obtain a larger number of representative firms in
each industry.
Other control variables in the performance equation. In addition to search deviation, the
key variable that was hypothesized to affect organizational performance, several other variables
that were also expected to influence performance were included as controls. First, because a
firm’s total number of patents to some extent represents its technological capability and a key
element of the firm’s stock of knowledge resource, it was hypothesized to have a positive
effect on both measures of organizational performance (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993). This variable
is measured as the count of the number of patents applied during each year by each firm.
Second, a firm’s technological scope is an important feature of the firm’s knowledge base:
The broader is a firm’s innovative scope, the more likely it is to patent in many different
classes and possibly the more likely it is be cited more (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). Greater inno-
vation and patent citations will in turn possibly affect the firm’s market value.
In addition, several of other variables in the search equation, including financial distress,
organizational slack, and performance aspiration, are obviously associated with firm financial
performance and were thus also included in the performance equations. Firm size was also
included in the performance equations because there is some evidence that size negatively
influences firm profitability (Cubbin & Leech, 1986). This negative relationship could be
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attributable to the diminishing returns to scale as a result of increasing complexity of the oper-
ations in big firms or could be attributable to the excessive rigidity of big firms while coping
with change and uncertainty (Ling, Zhao, & Baron, 2007). Size as a control variable is not
shown in the models with innovation performance as the dependent variable, because it served
as an offset variable3 and thus was omitted in the negative binomial regressions. Moreover,
because industry factors are often expected to affect organizational performance, we also
included industry concentration and the industry dummy variables, in addition to including
environmental dynamism as a moderator, as controls in the performance models.
Results
Table 1 provides a summary and zero-order correlation statistics for the main variables.
The descriptive statistics indicate that the firms were characterized by significant diversity in
their search behavior, innovation performance, financial performance, and other firm- and
industry-level attributes. As expected, both measures of firm-level searches had significant
correlations among each other, with measures of industry-level search, and with lagged search
variables. Also consistent with our expectation, industry-level search was not significantly
related with the performance measures. Although lagged explorative search beyond firm was
significantly related to the performance measures, significant correlations were not found for
explorative search beyond domain. The correlations between number of patents and both
search measures were negative and significant (–.27 and –.22, respectively), suggesting that
a firm with a larger patent stock is less likely to explore through citing other firms’ patents
or patents beyond its existing domain.
Determinants of Knowledge Search
Table 2 presents the results of the models with the level of search as the dependent vari-
able. The dependent variable in Model 1 was explorative search beyond the organizational
boundary; the dependent variable in Model 2 was explorative search beyond the technological
domain.
Models 1 and 2 demonstrate consistent patterns of results for a number of key firm- and
industry-level variables. As predicted, both lagged search and industry-level search (either
beyond firm or beyond domain) had positive and significant effects on the current search
behavior. The industry concentration ratio, which is a proxy for industry-level competition,
was also found to have a significant negative effect on the degree of explorative search for
both models, supporting the argument that lack of competition reduces firms’ incentives to
explore. Also consistent with our predictions, there was a positive association between envi-
ronmental dynamism (as indicated by variations in industry sales) and explorative search,
supporting the argument that market uncertainty tends to stimulate exploration (Andrews,
1980; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Teece et al., 1997). In both models, technological scope, or
the diversity in patent classes, had a significantly negative effect on explorative search, indi-
cating that firms in broader technology areas allocate more of their efforts to exploitative
search, both within the firm and within their technology domains. But we did not find a
significant effect of performance aspirations on search behavior.
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Table 2
Determinants of Explorative Search: Results From First-Stage 
Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions
Variables Search Beyond Firm, Model 1 Search Beyond Domain, Model 2
Intercept 2.31*** (0.35) 3.02*** (0.38)
Firm size 0.08** (0.03) –0.06* (0.03)
Technology scope –0.42*** (0.04) –0.59*** (0.04)
Financial distress –0.04* (0.02) –0.04† (0.02)
Organizational slack 0.02* (0.01) –0.01 (0.02)
Performance aspiration –0.08 (0.08) 0.07 (0.09)
Environmental dynamism 4.55* (2.23) 4.01† (2.30)
Industry concentration (×102) –0.44* (0.21) –0.40* (0.19)
Lagged search variable 0.63*** (0.09) 0.67*** (0.11)
Industry-level search 0.07*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.02)
R2 .81 .77
Hausman’s test for endogeneity *** **
No. of observations 2,006 2,006
Note: Values are percentages. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Year dummies and industry dummies are
included but are not shown.
†p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Different from our predictions that firms tend to engage in more explorative search
when they approach bankruptcy (Ketchen & Palmer, 1999; March & Shapira, 1987),
financial distress was found to be negatively associated with explorative search beyond
both firm boundaries and technological domains. This finding suggests that instead of
taking on more risks, firms tend to behave conservatively under financial distress by
engaging in more exploitation (D’Aveni, 1989). Somewhat different findings for the
two types of explorative search were found for organizational slack and firm size. Both
of these two variables had positive effects on explorative search beyond firm boundaries
but negative (or insignificant) effects on explorative search beyond technological
domains. This may indicate that firms with greater resources are likely to engage in more
exploration beyond firm boundaries but constrain themselves to exploitation within their
exiting technological domains.
The significant coefficients found for most of these predicting variables (with the excep-
tion of performance aspiration) support our argument that firm search behavior is endoge-
nously determined by various firm and industry factors. Further support for this argument
can be found from the Hausman’s test of endogeneity. As shown in Table 2, the Hausman’s test
statistics indicate strong endogeneity in both of the search variables (all significant to at least
the .01 level).4
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Effect of Search Deviation on Organizational Performance
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the effect on firm performances of
the degree of deviation between a firm’s actual search behavior and optimal search behavior.
Table 3 has innovation performance as the dependent variable, and Table 4 has Tobin’s q as
the dependent variable. The results from the full sample models indicate that overall search
deviation had a significantly negative impact on both firm innovation performance and finan-
cial performance as indicated by Tobin’s q. These consistent results suggest that the degree
of deviation between actual search and optimal search predicted by firm and industry attributes
did affect firm performance. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 1.
Although the specifications presented in the full sample models contribute to our under-
standing of the effect of search deviation on innovation performance, this contribution is lim-
ited to the extent that the estimated coefficients on knowledge search deviation are restricted
to be equivalent across the two types of deviation from predicted search, overexploration (or
exploration above predicted level) and overexploitation (or exploration below the predicted
level). We then relaxed this constraint by separately estimating models using subgroups
of the sample for overexploration and overexploitation, respectively. The results are largely
consistent with those from the full sample, except for the overexploitation sample when
explorative search beyond technological domain was used to define firm search behavior and
when Tobin’s q was used as the dependent variable (the last two equations in Table 4).
Next, we examined the interactions effects of search deviation and environmental
dynamism. In the full sample, although the coefficients on the interaction terms were signif-
icant for some of the models, the results were not consistent and have different signs for the
two performance measures. The lack of clear pattern in these results is not surprising given
that the full sample included both firms that overexplore and those that overexploit and that
we predicted opposite moderating effect of environmental dynamism for these two types of
firms. The results became more revealing when we examined the two subsamples (overex-
ploration and overexploration) separately. In particular, we found positive and significant
interaction effects for all models in the sample of firms that overexplored. In contrast, when
the sample of firms that overexploit was examined, the interaction effects became negative
for most of these models (three of four models) and two of the models also showed signifi-
cant signs. Thus, we found some support for Hypothesis 2a, that is, that the negative effect
of overexploitation on organizational performance is greater with a high level of environ-
mental dynamism. On the other hand, we found very strong support for Hypothesis 2b,
which states that the negative effect of overexploration on organizational performance is mit-
igated with an increase in environmental dynamism.
To gain further insights into these moderating effects, we plotted the relationships between
search deviation (overexploration and overexploitation) and both innovation and financial
performances (Figures 1 and 2) to show how environmental dynamism moderates these rela-
tionships. Both figures further confirm that the relationship between search deviation and firm
performance and the moderating effect of environmental dynamism were largely in the direc-
tion predicted in the hypotheses. Both overexploration and overexploitation were negatively
associated with firm performance. Furthermore, the figures clearly demonstrate the different
moderating effect of environmental dynamism for overexploration and overexploitation: The
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relationship between overexploration and firm performance was less negative but that
between overexploitation and firm performance was more negative at a high level of environ-
mental dynamism.
Discussion
Because of the heterogeneity across firms in terms of their internal knowledge resources
and asset conditions as well as differences in their operational environments, firms’ appro-
priate knowledge search strategies in terms of exploitation and exploration should also vary
greatly on the need for a fit between their search strategy and their unique firm and industry
conditions. However, because of the presence of managerial opportunism, hubris, and psy-
chological biases, some firms may deviate from their optimal level of search that is predicted
by firm- and industry-level attributes. Given these situations, the first contribution of this
study to the knowledge search literature is an examination of the effect of search deviation
on organizational performance. Using patent citations data to construct the proxies for firm
search behavior and to derive unique measures of search deviation, we found strong empir-
ical support for the argument that the level of search deviation is negatively associated with
organizational performance. This fills a gap in the knowledge search literature because the
current study is the first to explore the search deviation–performance relationship. We hope
that our efforts will remind researchers of the importance of considering the effect of search
deviation, rather than search strategies themselves, on organizational performance.
Drawing on the distinction between two types of search deviation in the analysis presented
on overexploitation and overexploration, we have further developed some intriguing arguments
that the moderating effect of environmental dynamism differs for the two types of search devi-
ation. In particular, the negative effect of overexploitation on organizational performance is
expected to be greater but that of overexploration is weaker with an increase in environmental
dynamism. Our empirical analyses largely support these novel predictions. Therefore, although
deviation from optimal search still hurts firm performance, the degree of these negative effects
varies with the features of the firm’s operational environment: Overexploration is still
damageable under environmental dynamism, but it is less damageable than a similar level of
overexploitation. This finding also provides valuable implications for practitioners and man-
agers: When mistakes are unavoidable because of the difficulty of engaging in the exact
“optimal” level of knowledge search, managers may minimize the potential damage by choosing
between search decisions—either overexploitation or overexploration—based on the level of
environmental dynamism.
The study generates some interesting implications for future research, which stem from
several of the study’s limitations. First, although we found very strong and consistent sup-
port for the hypothesized moderating effect of environmental dynamism on the relationship
between overexploration and organizational performance (Hypothesis 2b), we found limited
support for the hypothesized moderating effect on the relationship between overexploitation
and performance (Hypothesis 2a). In particular, although Hypothesis 2a was supported when
search and search deviation were measured in terms of firm boundary, it was not supported
when search and search deviation were measured in terms of technological boundary. This
finding seems to suggest that a high level of environmental dynamism increases the risk of
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overexploitation within firm boundary, but overexploitation within technological domain
does not become more harmful under environmental dynamism. We hope that future
research can explore the rationale behind this finding and, moreover, use more refined data
and methods to tease out the complexities raised here.
Second, although the focus here was on search beyond organizational and technological
boundaries (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), the framework used in this study can be extended
to the analysis of other dimensions of search that have been explored recently. These include
search depth and search scope (Katila & Ahuja, 2002), science search and geography or loca-
tion search (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004), and temporal search (Katila,
2002; Nerkar, 2003), among others. Understanding the nature of knowledge formation in
greater depth and in higher levels of complexity may require researchers to apply approaches
similar to those used in the current study to differentiate among various dimensions of search
and investigate their performance implications. Studies can also be designed to explore
issues related to changes in search behavior over time. For example, what would be the per-
formance implications if a firm suddenly changed its search strategy from more explorative
search to more exploitative search, or vice versa?
Third, we recognize that this study may not be fully generalizable to all knowledge search
situations because it used patent data and was limited to manufacturing firms. A key drawback
of patent citation data is that patents measure only codified knowledge, but much of firm
knowledge cannot be codified. Thus, these results are not likely to be applicable to industries
where patents and citations are not important indicators of firms’ knowledge assets. Future
studies may explore more comprehensive measures of search behavior that encompass
broader categories of firm knowledge assets and more diverse industry contexts.
Fourth, although we believe that treating exploitation and exploration as a continuum is
appropriate in the context of this article, some recent literature indicated the need to regard
them as orthogonal choices (e.g., Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips,
2004; Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 2003). For example,
Baum et al. (2000) viewed exploitative learning (learning from a firm’s own experience) and
explorative learning (learning from others’ experience) as orthogonal, based on the idea that
both types of learning may be possible without the need to compete with limited resources.
Although no universal arguments may be made in favor of either treating exploitation and
exploration as continuous or treating them as orthogonal (Gupta et al., 2006), future research
may extend this study to examine how the implications may change if exploitation and explo-
ration are treated as orthogonal. For example, it may be reasonable to expect that under the
assumption of orthogonality, each search pattern (exploitation or exploration) should have its
distinct optimal level that maximizes firm performance. Therefore, each firm would have two
different optimal levels of exploitation versus exploration. As a result, although this study
considered over(under) exploration the same as under(over) exploitation and thus only
examined overexploration and overexploitation, future studies treating exploitation/exploration
as orthogonal may be able to examine the performance implications of both over- and under-
exploitation as well as those of both over- and underexploration.
Furthermore, treating exploitation/exploration as orthogonal enables researchers to examine
the interrelationship between the two domains of organizational learning. For example, the
performance benefit of a firm’s doing well in exploration may be further influenced by how
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well the firm does in exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006). This is in line with a growing literature
that holds the ambidexterity hypothesis (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Burgelman, 1991, 2002; He
& Wong, 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Knott, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993; Tushman &
O’Reilly, 1996), which emphasizes that firms capable of both exploring and exploiting do
better than firms rooted in either one (Beckman, 2006; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).
Fifth, although existing theories as well as statistical techniques such as those applied
here are valuable in identifying and controlling for underlying firm characteristics that deter-
mine firms’ optimal search level, we believe it would be promising for future research to fur-
ther develop and apply appropriate theories that help to predict the level of the optimal
search as well as deviation in search. More solid efficiency-based theoretical frameworks
that explain firm search behavior will help identify the underlying characteristics more accu-
rately. For example, although we drew on the institutional theory in this study to include an
industry-level variable, industry search norm, as an antecedent of firm-level search, addi-
tional insights can be gained by examining the legitimacy concerns that lead a firm to mimic
the search behavior of the successful firms in the industry. Along with the effort of this study,
some other recent works (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2007)
have already headed in that direction by further unraveling the specific factors that underlie
firms’ search behavior.
Sixth, this study examined the moderating effect of environmental dynamism in terms of
volatility in industry demand on the relationship between deviation from optimal search
behavior and organizational performance. Nonetheless, environmental dynamism may be
multifaceted (e.g., Castrogiovanni, 2002; Dess & Beard, 1984) and there might be other
dimensions of environmental dynamism, such as dynamism in employment, in technology,
and in the level of competition, that were not taken into consideration in this study. Although
demand dynamism has been considered a key aspect of environmental dynamism and was
the aspect most frequently used in previous studies (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Keats & Hitt, 1988;
Simerly & Li, 2000; Wholey & Brittain, 1989), it would be fruitful to also consider the other
aspects of environmental dynamism and examine how they may provide different implica-
tions for the arguments developed here. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that some
other industry- or firm-level factors may also affect this relationship. For example, the
resource-based and evolutionary theories of the firm perspective may be integrated into the
arguments made in this article to explore how the negative effect of knowledge search devi-
ation may vary with each firm’s unique circumstances and other environmental characteris-
tics. Such consideration of other possible moderators may shed light on variations in the
relationship between search deviation and performance contingent on industry- and firm-
specific features. In addition, although our main interest in this article was the performance
effect of search deviation, an equally interesting research potential is to empirically explore
the factors that cause search deviation that have been argued in this study, such as agency
costs, psychological bias, and other managerial decision-making complexities.
Despite these limitations, this article is the first to examine the performance implications
of the degree to which a firm’s actual level of knowledge search deviates from the optimal
level as predicted by the firm and industry conditions. This report provides further support for
the argument that the negative effect of search deviation on organizational performance varies
with environmental dynamism. We believe that the study contributes to our understanding of
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the complexities associated with both the antecedents and consequences of firm knowledge
search strategies and their interconnections with the firms’ operational environment.
Notes
1. To the extent that both exploitation of existing knowledge and the exploration of new knowledge are essential
for organizational learning, they are not always mutually exclusive. In some studies, exploitation and exploration were
treated as orthogonal (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Beckman et al., 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 2003). This alter-
native treatment is considered more appropriate in settings where there is little resource constraint and where exploita-
tion and exploration can be categorized into two different domains (Gupta et al., 2006).
2. We have conducted partial F tests for these two instruments as a set and found that the corresponding par-
tial F statistics are at least greater than 98 (for different search measures), which is significantly above the critical
value of 11.59 (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). This indicates that the two variables serve as strong instruments in
our analyses.
3. An offset variable is often used in Poisson or negative binomial regression. It is an explanatory variable whose
coefficient is fixed at 1.0.
4. We further conducted a two-stage least squared analysis of the search–performance relationship and compared
the results with and without taking into consideration of the endogeneity of search. Without controlling for endogene-
ity, we found that an increase in explorative search expanding organizational boundaries was associated with supe-
rior organizational performance; but search expanding technological boundaries was associated with low
organizational performance. However, the effect of search behavior on firm performance becomes largely nonsignifi-
cant after we controlled for search endogeneity. We conducted additional robustness tests using two alternative models
that also account for the endogeneity of search behavior: Heckman’s selection models and firm fixed effect models.
We found very similar result patterns. Taken together, these analyses suggest that the effect of search behavior on inno-
vation performance becomes much weaker after the endogeneity of search is controlled for. Detailed results for these
analyses are available from the authors on request.
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